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ABSTRACT 
Approaching 1997, Hong Kong's role as the bridge between foreign 
investors and China enterprises in facilitating capital formation enterprises becomes 
more and more important, as evidenced by increasing number of China enterprises with 
shares listed and traded in Hong Kong. A survey by the Stock Exchange reveals that 
the integrity of the stock market is an important element when foreign investors 
consider whether to invest in Hong Kong stock market. Previously, insider dealing 
attracts the penalty of public reprimand only. The new ordinance imposes tougher 
penalty but still it is not a criminal offence. Based on disclosure of changes in 
shareholding in a listed company by its substantial shareholders and directors as 
required by Hong Kong law, a study shows that these insiders ’s dealing can out-
perform the market. The result is consistent to some previous researches on foreign 
stocks. Obviously, the better performance by the insider is due to their access to 
privileged information about the listed company, some of which is price sensitive. This 
study is to find out whether there are interesting characteristics of these publicly 
disclosed insiders' activities. It is hoped that the result will be useful for the reference 
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At the third plenary session of the eleventh Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 1978, it was the first time the direction towards "socialist 
modernisation" was given green light. This term is now better known as the "market 
socialism". One result of the economic reform was the reissuance of stocks and bonds 
by the state and corporations. Following the opening of the Shanghai Securities 
Exchange (“SSF，）and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (“SZSE”）in 1990 and 1991 
respectively, these stocks and bonds can be traded on organised exchanges. While 
foreign investors are not allowed to hold "A" shares listed on SSE and SZSE which 
are for Chinese citizens only, they are allowed to hold "B" shares. In addition to "B" 
shares, foreign investors can also buy the "H" shares which are listed on The Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong Limited ("SEEK") or “1” shares which are listed on other 
overseas exchanges. By the end of 1994, a total of 15 ‘H，share enterprises had been 
listed on the SEHK, raising a total ofHK$17,934 million. 
As of 16 June 1993，market capitalisation of SSE and SZSE were US$502 
million and US$430 million respectively. They are, of course, significantly lower than 
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that of Hong Kong, which is now ranked the seventh in terms of market capitalisation 
among other stock markets in the world. As of the end of 1994，the total market 
capitalisation of Hong Kong stock market was HK$2,085 billion. Although the SSE 
and SZSE are more sophisticated than before, they are not as good as the SEHK for 
large capital-raising exercise. At the time being, Hong Kong is still playing an 
important role in the capital formation of China. 
In order to facilitate China to tap the capital of foreign investors, the SEHK 
as well as the regulatory body are trying their best to provide an ideal investment 
environment for foreign investors. According to a survey on foreign investors 
conducted by the SEHK in 1993，foreign investors will also concern about the integrity 
of a stock market when they decide whether to invest in it. Insider dealing activities 
may be one of their concern. 
Under the present Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (“SIDO，，)，insider 
dealing refers to those securities dealing engaged by those persons making use of 
price-sensitive information which is privileged only to them about a listed company. In 
the other words, buyer and seller in a transaction do not trade on the same amount of 
essential information. This is not fair to the party who has no access to the price-
sensitive information. 
Is the problem of insider dealing serious in Hong Kong? Pursuant to the 
old ordinance which was replaced by the SIDO on 1 September 1991, there were a 
total of three cases put before the Insider Dealing Tribunal. Under the SIDO, there 
was two cases referred to the Tribunal. According to the latest annual report by the 
、 
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Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC"), which is the front line regulatory body 
oversee the securities and futures markets in Hong Kong, there are several insider 
dealing cases going to be referred to the Tribunal. 
Provided that the number of cases referred to the Tribunal truly reflect the 
level of insider dealing activities cases in Hong Kong, the situation is regarded as under 
control and does not warrant too much concern. However, due to the reason below, 
we thought that the problem of insider dealing may be more serious than as suggested 
by the number of cases referred to the Insider Dealing Tribunal so far: 
(1) In Hong Kong, most of the listed companies are family business and tightly 
controlled by the family members. It is very often to see substantial shareholder 
sitting on the board of directors. As a result, the substantial shareholders in Hong 
Kong, unlike those in US and UK, are also directors of the company. This gives 
the substantial shareholders, in addition to directors, access to privy information 
related to the listed companies. This result cast doubts on whether they have 
engaged in insider dealing when trading their own shares; and 
(2) Hong Kong has a more than a hundred-year history of stock market. Following 
the economic development, the stock market grew bigger and bigger. However, 
regulatory framework did not go at the same pace as the development of the stock 
market. It was hot until 1974 when the first securities-related legislation the 
Securities Ordinance was introduced. Part XIIA of the ordinance touches upon 
insider dealing. Under this ordinance, insider dealing is not a criminal offence. 
I 
4 
Any person found culpable of insider dealing will receive public reprimand. On 1 
September 1991, a new ordinance the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance 
("SIDO") was introduced to replace Part XIIA of the Securities Ordinance. The 
new ordinance introduced several penalty measures. For instances, insider dealer is 
now liable to a fine of three times of the profit made or loss avoided as a result of 
insider dealing. He may also be required to pay a fine to the government of an 
amount equal to the profit made or loss avoided. In addition, he may be barred 
from being a director of any listed companies in Hong Kong for a maximum period 
of five years. Despite the above penalty, insider dealing is still not a criminal 
offence. 
By virtue of the reasons given above, we believe that Hong Kong stock 
market is more prone to insider dealing activities than other advanced securities market 
in the world such as US and UK. Recently, a brokerage house Credit Lyonnais 
conducted a study to see whether directors and substantial shareholders of a listed 
company can sustain abnormal return from their trading in the shares in their company. 
The result was positive. In other words, directors and substantial shareholders are 
better than an ordinary investors in investing in the shares of the company they 
manage. What makes the difference between their performance? An overriding 
answer seems to be their privy access to price sensitive information related to the 
company. 
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Objective of This Study 
The objective of this project is to assess the level of insider dealing 
activities in the following dimensions: industry type, company size, seasonal effect, and 
ownership concentration. We hope that this study will stimulate other people 
interested in this topic to look at this issue in another angle and provide a base for 
further study in this area. 
The structure of this report is as follows: as the regulatory body in Hong 
Kong is often growing side by side with the stock market, Chapter II which introduces 
the development of stock exchange in Hong Kong and Chapter III which brings out 
the current situation of the SEHK comes before Chapter IV which touches on 
regulatory environment of securities market in Hong Kong. It is then followed by 
Chapter V and VI which gives a brief account of the Securities (Insider Dealing) 
Ordinance and Securities (Disclosure of Interest) Ordinance respectively. Chapter VH 
gives a collection of literature review of previous research primarily conducted in 
related areas but on overseas stock. Chapter VHI and IX is the design and result of 
our empirical study. Chapter X presents the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STOCK MARKET IN HONG KONG 
Development of the Stock Exchange 
The trading of stocks in Hong Kong can be back dated to early 1890's. The 
Association of Stockbrokers was established in 1891 and was the first organized stock 
exchange in Hong Kong. It was renamed The Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1914. 
However, there was no Chinese members in this stock exchange. In 1921, The Hong 
Kong Stockbrokers Association was established and all the members were Chinese. 
These two exchanges were merged together to become The Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange Limited (HKSE) in 1947. In order to target those Chinese-controlled 
companies and local investors, the Far East Exchange (FEE) was established in 1969. 
Stocks were generally priced at low levels with small lot size to allow the participation 
of the general public. 
Due to the growing activities in the stock markets, two more exchanges 
were then opened: the Kam Ngan Stock Exchange in 1971 and the Kowloon Stock 
Exchange in 1972. A large number of companies were cross-listed in more than one 
exchange. The listing requirements were different from one exchange to another. The 
HKSE and FEE were the more important exchanges because most of the companies 
7 
obtained their first listing in the HKSE while the turnover was highest in FEE. 
Eventually, all these four exchanges were merged together to form the current The 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (SEHK) in 1986. In order to further increase 
the efficiency and capacity of the trading system, a new clearing system, the Central 
Clearing And Settlement System (CCASS) and a new trading system, the Automatic 
Order Matching and Execution System have been launched in 1993. This also added 
transparency to the SEHK. 
The benchmark index, Hang Seng Index (HSI) had its base set at 100 
points in 1964 and the component stocks keep on changing to have a better 
representation of the whole market. There are currently 33 component stocks and the 
names are listed in Table-1. After hitting the peak of 12,559.23 on 4 Jan 94 as shown 
in Figure-1, the HSI is now traded within the range of 8,000 and 9,000 in April 1995. 
The trading of HSI Futures Contracts were launched in 1984 after the 
renaming of Hong Kong Commodities Exchange to Hong Kong Futures Exchange 
(HKFE). This move helped the SEHK to become more internationalized by providing 
more derivative products and hedging instruments, like HSI Index Options, to foreign 
investors. However, it also played an important role during the market crash in 1987. 
Those who had long position in the HSI Futures could not honour their contracts after 




HANG SENG INDEX COMPONENT STOCKS 
Sector Stock Name Weighting 
Finance 5 HSBC Holdings PLC “ 16.087% 
J J Hang Seng Bank Ltd 6.927% 
23 Bank of East Asia Ltd 1.287% 
Properties 1 Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd ~ 5.204% 
10 Hang Lung Development Co Ltd 1.049% 
12 Henderson Land Development Co Ltd 4.718% 
14 Hysan Development Co Ltd 1.150% 
_26 Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd 8.139% 
1 7 New World Development Co Ltd 2.208% 
_41 Great Eagle Holdings Ltd 0.444% 
Hopewell Holdings Ltd 1.683% 
Sino Land Co Ltd 0.779% 
101 Amoy Properties Ltd 1.045% 
Utilities _2 China Light & Power Co Ltd 4.930% 
J Hong Kong & China Gas Co Ltd 1.881% 
j6 Hongkong Electric (Holdings) Ltd 3.491% 
8 Hong Kong Telecommunications Ltd 11.506% 
Commercial & _4 Wharf (Holdings) Ltd 3.586% 
Industrial _13 Hutchison Whampoa Ltd 8.571% 
1 8 Oriental Press Group Ltd 0.315% 
19 Swire Pacific Ltd 'A' 3.580% 
20 Wheelock and Co Ltd 1.747% 
4 4 Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Co Ltd 0.258% 
4 5 Hong Kong & Shanghai Hotels Ltd 0.686% 
69 Shangri-La Asia Ltd 0.587% 
_71 Miramar Hotel & Investment Co Ltd 0.569% 
179 Johnson Electric Holdings Ltd 0.433% 
242 Shun Tak Holdings Ltd 0.483% 
267 Citic Pacific Ltd 2.680% 
Guangdong Investment Ltd 一 0.491% 
293 Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd 2.209% 
511 • Television Broadcasts Ltd 0.852% 
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Besides those traditional stock trading, the SEHK is also trying to widen 
the product range. The options on some individual stock is expected to be launched in 
August of 1995 and short-selling are legalised for certain stocks. To facilitate short 
selling, the maximum borrowing period for relief from stamp duty for stock borrowing 
and lending was extended from 14 days to 12 months. 
Seen as competing with the SEHK, the HKFE has started the trading of the 
stock futures on Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Corporation and Hong Kong Telecom 
on 31 March 1995. Since the SEHK will become one of the stock exchanges in China 
after 1997，another important move is to keep arranging more Chinese enterprises to 
be listed in Hong Kong. 
Performance of Stock Market 
The performance of the Hong Kong stock market is shown in Figure-2. It 
is basically built on four big rallies since the HSI has been adopted. The first one 
occurred in 1972 after the banking crisis in late 60’s which forced people to raise 
money from the stock market rather than the banking system. The HSI reached its 
peak of 1,775 in 1973. The number of new listings and turnover went up 
tremendously. As compare to those in mid-60's, the number of listed companies was 
doubled, the market capitalization increased by four times and the market turnover 
went up by 50 times. Following the oil crisis and the worldwide economic recession, 
the HSI plunged by almost 90% to a low of 150 in December 1974. The index could 
not reach another new high until 1979. At that moment, the market was fueled by the 
11 
surge in property prices as well as the easy money stemming from structural defects in 
Hong Kong's monetary and exchange rate system. However, the political uncertainty 
of Hong Kong after 1997, the high inflation and thus high interest rate hit the 
sentiment and ended the bull market in 1982. 
After the Joint Declaration was signed by both the Chinese and British 
Government, people regained confidence in Hong Kong. Together with the worldwide 
stock market rally, the HSI went up sharply coincidentally with the establishment of 
the SEHK. The HSI rose from 1,200 in late 1984 to 3,900 in early October 1987. 
The turnover increased by 7 times during this period. This rally came to an end with 
the Black Monday worldwide stock market crash on 19 October 1987. The self-
imposed four-days closure of the SEHK made the overall sentiment even worse and 
the HSI plunged 33% when the stock market was reopened on 26 October. Even 
there had been a small market crash on 4 June 1989 due to the political turmoil in 
China, the stock market resumed energy in 1990 with increased international interest in 
investing China through Hong Kong. The re-confirmation of the open door policy by 
Deng Xiao. Peng in 1992 made the sentiment even stronger. With the influx of 
international funds in late 1993，the HSI hit a record high of 12,599 in January 1994. 
Nevertheless, due to the austerity control by the Chinese Government as well as the 
unexpected early rise in the US interest rate, the HSI started to decline with the slump 
in property prices since early 1994 and once broke through below the 7,000 level. 
Looking back, the HSI has grown almost 80 times as depicted by Figure-3 
since it was adopted in 1964. Turnover is up by 800 times while the market 
capitalization has increased by over 130 times. The number of listed company also 
12 
expanded by 7 times. During the same period, real GDP has gone up only 7 times and 
nominal GDP by 54 times. 
13 
FIGlJRE-3 
MONTHLY TURNOVER OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG, 
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THE CURRENT SITUATION OF THE SEHK 
Since the market reformed after the 1987 crash, there had been big changes 
in the constitution, organizational structure, management and regulatory authorities in 
both the SEHK and HKFE. They have put great stress on fairness, efficiency, security 
and transparency to maintain the attractiveness and competitiveness of Hong Kong 
being an international financial center. 
Performance in 1994 
It has been a successful year for the SEHK in fiscal year 1994 ended 30 
June. Financially they are strong with a net surplus ofHK$62 millions versus HK$47 
millions in 1993. More than 50% of the revenue came from the transaction levy. On 
the stock market side, the HSI was up 23% to 8,758.41 on 30 June 94 from the last 
year. The market capitalization also grew 25% to $HK2,241 billion with 508 listed 
companies (Figure-4 and Figure-5). Hong Kong is now the second largest stock 
market in Asia after Japan and is the seventh largest in the world. New capital raised 
went up substantially by 222% to HK$433 billions (Figure-6). With the influx of 
15 
foreign investment funds, the turnover jumped 73% to HK$1,435 billions with a record 
day ofHK$17.2 billions on 7 January 1994. (Figure-7) 
Individual members are still playing an important role in the SEHK even 
though the number of corporate members has been increasing steadily (Table-2). 
There are 308 individual members, or 54.61% of total membership, while there are 256 
corporate members. Among them, only 68 members or 12.06% are non-trading as of 
30 June 94. According to the third Annual Members Transaction Survey conducted in 
November 1993, 70% of the total turnover was done by local investors and 42% of the 
total turnover was contributed by local retail investors. Local and overseas 
institutional agency trading formed 27% each of total turnover. 
TABLE-2 
MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG 
Individual Corporate Total 
No. % No. % No. % ~ 
31 December 1987 688 89.00— 85 11.00 773 100 
1988 621 83.92 ‘ 119 1 6 " ^ 740 100 
1989 — 574 80.73 137 19.27 711 100 
1990 - 542 78.78 146 21.22 — 688 1 0 0 ~ 
1991 - 499 74.37 172 25.63 — 671 1 0 0 ~ 
1992 423 68.23 “ 197 31.77 620 100 
1993 343 59.24" 236 40.76 579 100 
31 March 1994 I 321 56.32 | 249 43.68 | 570 100 
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FUNDS RAISED FROM THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG, 
1986- 1993 
(Year Ended 31 December ) 
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Being one of the windows for China to access to foreign investors, the 
SEHK has successfully helped the listing of 11 China State Enterprises as 'H' shares up 
to the fiscal year 1994, the whole first batch of 9 enterprises and 2 from the second 
batch. The benchmark for these 'H' shares, Hang Seng China Enterprises Index was 
launched in August 1994. All the listed 'H' shares are the component of this index. 
Thus, the investors can have a clearer picture of the overall performance of these 
shares and also this helps the further development of new products for this particular 
sector e.g. index futures. The SEHK also conducted road shows in London, Tokyo 
and New York together with Professor Liu Hongni, the former Chairman of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission to promote 'H' shares in Hong Kong on the topic of 
•The Hong Kong Stock Market in a Chinese Dimension'. Other than these China 
enterprises, there are quite a lot other 'overseas' companies have their shares primarily 
listed on the SEHK. They are basically local companies but incorporated overseas, 
mainly in Bermuda and Cayman Islands to overcome their worry on the 1997 problem. 
Even though the total number of these overseas companies accounts for over 50% of 
all the listed companies on the SEHK, their market capitalization is only about one-
third of the total amount. 
The SEHK is also famous for its attractive low transaction brokerages and 
fees. The minimum brokerage commissions and transaction levy charged to clients are 
0.25% and 0.02% of the transaction amount respectively for both buyer and seller. 
The special levy has been suspended since 16 August 1993. As a comparison, the total 
commission chargeable in other emerging stock markets in Asia such as Singapore, 
\ 
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Malaysia and Thailand are around 1%. Such low transaction cost provides Hong 
Kong with a strong competitive edge in the Asia Pacific region. 
Future Development of the SEHK 
Besides the traded options market, the SEHK is working hard to further 
develop the debt market. There have already been 84 new listings of supranational, 
state and corporate debts in fiscal year 1994. With more and more listed companies 
obtaining rating from S & P or Moody's, the debt market is a cheaper channel for them 
to raise fund. 
In the near future, the SEHK is working hard towards the direction to make 
itself the major stock market for the overseas listing of those China enterprises. Other 
foci are to study the feasibility of introducing the market maker system to the SEHK 
and the second section trading in the SEHK. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF THE STOCK MARKET 
OF HONG KONG 
History of Securities Legislation in Hong Kong 
Presently, there are 8 ordinances which are relevant to the securities 
industry in Hong Kong. They are: 
(1) Securities Ordinance (Cap.333) 
(2) Securities and Futures Commission (Cap.24) 
(3) Stock Exchanges Unification Ordinance (Cap. 361) 
(4) Protection of Investors Ordinance (Cap.335) 
(5) Companies Ordinance (Cap.32) 
(6) Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (Cap.395) 
‘ (7) Securities (Disclosure of Interest) Ordinance (Cap. 396) 
(8) Securities (Clearing Houses) Ordinance (Cap.420) 
It may surprise many people by the fact that while Hong Kong had its first 
stock exchange in 1891, it has its first securities related ordinance - the Securities 
Ordinance - enacted only in 1974. A close scrutiny on the history of regulation on 
i 
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stock market in Hong Kong reveals that these securities related legislation came out as 
a result of problem surfaced after the several stock crashes. The first one went back to 
the stock crash in 1974. 
In 1974，the Hang Seng Index fell from a high of 1,775 in 1973 to a low of 
150. Thousands of investors incurred tremendous losses in their stock investment. 
This prompted the government to introduce securities legislation on stock market 
activities. The Securities Ordinance was enacted in 1974. Securities Ordinance is by 
now the most comprehensive and important piece of securities legislation in Hong 
Kong. It covers a wide range of areas: functions and powers of the regulatory bodies, 
the registration and financial requirements of intermediaries, records and documents to 
be kept by brokers, various malpractice such as market manipulation, insider dealing 
and hawking of securities. 
In the same year, the Securities Commission and the Office of the 
Commissioner for Securities, a government department, were set up to administer the 
Ordinance, oversee the four stock exchanges and to license and oversee brokers and 
investment advisers. 
The Protection of Investors Ordinance was also enacted in 1974. This 
ordinance primarily deals with distribution of unauthorised investment promotion 
materials to investing public by unregistered persons. Moreover, investors are also 
protected from being induced to investment arrangements or securities transactions by 
way of fraudulent misrepresentation. 
\ 
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In 1980, the Stock Exchange Unification Ordinance was enacted to enable 
the establishment of a single, unified Stock Exchange in Hong Kong and the winding 
up of the four exchanges. This ordinance paved the way fro the later unification of the 
four stock exchanges in 1986. 
Another stock crash occurred worldwide in 1987. In October 1987 the 
Stock Exchange was closed for four days. When it re-opened, the Hang Seng Index 
dropped by a massive 33%, down to 2241.63. 
Again, this market crash again exposed severe weakness both in the 
securities and futures markets in Hong Kong. In view of the massive defaults by 
futures brokers, the government with the assistance from some major banks in Hong 
Kong, injected a total of HK$40 billion into the Hong Kong Futures Guarantee 
Corporation to save it and the futures market from bankruptcy. To provide long term 
solution, the government appointed a Securities Review Committee ("SRC") headed 
by Mr. Ian Hay Davison to carry out a critical review of the securities and futures 
industry in Hong Kong. 
The report was published in June 1988 recommending sweeping changes to 
address the inadequacies exposed by the stock crash. 
In accordance with the SRC, the then existing regulatory bodies, the Office 
of the Commissioner for Securities and Commodities Trading, the Commodities 
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Trading Commission and the Securities Commission, were replaced by SFC. It is an 
establishment outside the government civil service structure but is required to report to 
the Financial Secretary. The reason behind is to allow greater flexibility in policy 
making and handling emergency matters. It was formally established in May 1989 
under the enactment of the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance ("SFC 
Ordinance，，)，which set out the role of the SFC in regulating the securities and futures 
industry. The policy orientation of the SFC follows closely the recommendations of the 
SRC Report. 
To tighten the control of insider dealing activities and increase the infor-
mation disclosure of listed companies, the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance and 
the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance came into operation in September 
1991. The former amended Part XIIA of the Securities Ordinance to, among other 
things, provide a penalty equal to any profit made or loss avoided plus three times that 
amount applicable to insider dealing. These two ordinances will be discussed in more 
details in Chapter V and VI. 
The Securities (Clearing Houses) Ordinance was enacted in October, 1992. 
This Ordinance empowers the SFC to declare clearing houses to be recognized 
clearing houses, to approve rules of recognized clearing houses and to make provision 
for safeguarding the operations and procedures of recognized clearing houses and 
other related matters.. 
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Regulatory Hierarchy of the Securities Market in Hong Kong 
> 
The October 1987 stock market crash prompted the government to take 
vigorous action on regulation of the securities industry. Re-structuring of the Stock 
Exchange and establishment of the SFC both contributed to the rebuilding of the 
regulatory framework. 
At the top of the regulatory hierarchy is the Governor, who is empowered 
to appoint the chairman and executive directors of the SFC. 
The SFC is an independent regulatory body, serving to enforce and 
administer the SFC Ordinance and other securities-related ordinances. From 1 
September 1994 onwards, the SFC also looks over the leveraged foreign exchange 
trading in Hong Kong. It supervises the exchange companies, clearing houses, and 
registered persons, such as securities dealers and investment advisers. 
The exchange companies comprise the Stock Exchange and the Futures Ex-
change. They have responsibility for regulating their own markets and members. They 
make rules and regulations governing trading operations on stock and futures transac-
tions. The SFC monitors performance of their self-regulatory functions. 
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The Securities and Futures Commission 
The SFC is a non-government statutory body with most of the funding 
coming from levy charged on transactions gone through the SEHK and HKFE. 
Another source of finance comes from the government. 
The policy-making body of the SFC currently consists of a chairman and 
nine directors, all appointed by the Governor. Half of the directors of the Commission, 
including the chairman, are appointed to be executive directors, and half are appointed 
to be non-executive directors. Figure-8 depicts the organisation chart of the SFC as at 
31 March 1994. The non-executive directors include a cross section of community 
leaders, including a lawyer, an accountant, an Executive Council member, and two 
directors of major listed companies. The terms and conditions of the chairman and the 
offices of directors are determined by the Governor. On the one hand, a director may 
at any time resign his office; on the other, the Governor may, by notice in writing, 
remove from office any director of the SFC. 
Mission and Functions of the SFC 
According to the latest annual report of the SFC (1994)，the mission of the 
SFC is to promote user confidence in the efficiency and fairness of Hong Kong's 
securities market so as to support their continuing development, especially in relation 
to capital formation for the China region. 
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The functions of the SFC includes: 
(1) Supervise the Stock Exchange and the Futures Exchange, their markets, 
their members and clearing facilities. 
(2) Promote self-regulation of market bodies in the securities and futures 
industry. 
(3) Regulate other intermediaries (brokers, dealers, advisers etc.) not 
overseen by self-regulatory bodies in Hong Kong. 
(4) Regulate on behalf of the investing public the issue of securities and 
investment products (unit trusts and mutual funds, investment-linked 
insurance and pension fiinds, immigration-related investment funds, 
etc.), corporate disclosures and takeovers and mergers. 
(5) Enforce codes of conduct, regulations and relevant statutory 
requirements. 
‘ (6) Report the occurrence of insider dealing to the Financial Secretary. 
(7) Recommend appropriate legislative changes. 
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(8) Encourage the development of securities and futures markets in Hong 
Kong and the increased use of such markets by investors in Hong Kong 
and elsewhere. 
(9) Co-operate with and assist authorities in Hong Kong, or elsewhere, 
concerned with securities or futures. 
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FIGURE-8 
ORGANISATION CHART OF SECURITIES & FUTURES COMMISSION 
COMMISSION L 
Chairman Advisory Committee I 
Executive Director (4) I 
Non-Executive Director (5) ^ " H i a H a i ^ ^ ^ H B l l l ^ M B l 
Audit Committee L 
Remuneration Committee Regulatory Committees I 
Budget Committee '-mmi^mmam^^mmmmmm 
Chairman's Office U 
(including Public Affairs) Management Committee I 
Corporate Finance Markets Supervision Intermediaries Enforcement 
Division Division Division Division 
Member of Deputy Chairman Member of Member of 
Commission & of Commission & Commission & Commission & 
Executive Director Executive Director Executive Director Executive Director 
Laura Cha Robert Gitmore Michael Wu Gerard McMahon 
•24 .1 '32 '30 
"^HIB^^^HBIBHaH '-^^••••••^•••H "^"•^ •••••••HHH 
Chief Counsel Human Resources I Senior Director of 
Legal Services .3 I Finance, Technology 
Division & Secretariat Division 
David Little Rodney Farrar 
• 9 
* Number of Professional Staff as at 31 March 1994 
Source: SFC Annual Report 1993/1994, pl03. 
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CHAPTER V 
SECURITIES (INSIDER DEALING) ORDINANCE (“SIDO，，） 
The Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance came in operation on 1 
September, 1991, replacing Part XIIA of the Securities Ordinance. 
Definition of Insider Dealing 
Insider dealing, in simple terms, is the improper use by a person or 
corporation of privileged and relevant information, i.e., price sensitive information in 
trading securities. A person who is not strictly connected with a corporation will also 
be regarded as an insider dealer when he receives and deals on the basis of relevant 
information provided by someone who is. In other words, a man in the street can also 
have a chance to be considered an insider dealer. 
Section 9 of this Ordinance lays down various circumstances when insider 
dealing takes place. 
This insider dealing legislation is important to the investing public in the 
way that it aims at establishing a fair and orderly market so that every market 
\ 
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participant has access to the same information at the same time, and everybody is on a 
level playing field. 
Insider dealing is not a criminal offence but a person identified as an insider 
dealer can be heavily fined and have severe penalties imposed. For instance, registered 
persons in the securities industry and members of the Stock Exchange who have been 
identified as insider dealers may have their registration suspended or revoked. 
The Insider Dealing Tribunal (The Tribunal) 
The Insider Dealing Tribunal is the body which inquires into insider dealing 
cases, identifies all persons involved and imposes penalties. 
Meanwhile insider dealing has not been made a criminal offence, heavy 
penalties can be imposed. Some are described below: 
(1) a prohibition of up to five years from being a director, liquidator, 
receiver or a manager of a listed company or any other company 
specified by the Tribunal or in any way, whether directly or indirectly 
being concerned or taking part in the management of such companies; 
(2) payment to Government of an amount not exceeding the profit made or 
the loss avoided; and 
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CHAPTER VI 
SECURITIES (DISCLOSURE OF INTEREST) ORDINANCE ("SDIO") 
To ensure that there is a fair, orderly and efficient market for listed 
securities, investors should have access to relevant information upon which to base 
their investment decisions. It should be legally required that details of substantial 
shareholdings in listed companies and the holdings of the Directors and Chief 
Executives be disclosed 
In the US, rules on disclosure of interests existed as early as in the 1930s. 
Similar legislation appeared in the United Kingdom in 1967. There was not any 
legislation in Hong Kong until September 1991 when the Securities (Disclosure of 
Interests) Ordinance came into effect. 
Gist of the Ordinance 
The Ordinance requires disclosure of various interests in the share capital of 
listed companies. The main provisions are as follows: 
(1) Notification of a Substantial Shareholders' Interest. 
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(2) Notification by Directors and Chief Executives of their Interests. 
(3) Powers of Investigation into the Ownership of Shares and Restriction 
Orders relating to Shares. 
The Ordinance applies to shareholdings and interests in all companies listed 
on the SEHK regardless of their place of incorporation. 
Duties of Substantial Shareholders 
The duty arises when a person, to his knowledge, acquires an interest in 
relevant share capital equal to or exceeding ten percent of the share capital or ceases to 
be so interested. 
In addition, a substantial shareholder is also required to disclose changes in 
percentage level when his shareholding has already exceeded 10%. In order to simplify 
disclosure, only changes in the whole figure percentage level have to be disclosed. 
Fractional percentage change of shareholding will be rounded. For example, a 9.7% 
holding will be rounded down to 9%. 
A substantial shareholder is also deemed to be interested in the shares of his 




The person has to notify the SEHK as well as the company concerned of 
the above kind of changes. He has to do it within five days following the day on which 
the duty to disclose has arisen. 
For instances, Mr. Lee has exactly 12% of the share capital of Company K 
and has informed the listed company and the Stock Exchange of this. He then makes a 
market purchase of 500,000 shares representing 0.8% of the share capital of Company 
K. He does not need to disclose this new purchase. In another case, Mr. Lee then 
buys 0.3% more of Company K's shares. He thus holds 13.1%. His percentage level 
when rounded down is 13%. Compared with the 12% in Example 1，Mr. Lee must 
disclose his purchase to both the Company and the Stock exchange. 
Disclosure of Directors and Chief Executive 
A person who is a director or chief executive of a listed company needs to 
declare his interest (however small) in shares or debentures of that company or any 
associated corporation. Directors have to disclose every acquisition or disposal of 
shares or debentures they make. In other words, their disclosure requirement is more 
stringent than that of the substantial shareholders. The reason behind this is because a 
director has ready access to inside information as he is the one managing the daily 
affairs of the listed company. Therefore, it is more fair to enable an ordinary investor 
to scrutinise any investment action of him. 
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A Director is taken to be interested in his spouse's and children's shares and 
debentures even though they themselves are not directors 
Interests That Can Be Disregarded 
Section 14 of the Ordinance sets out the interests that can be disregarded 
and need not be disclosed, those listed below are more relevant to stockbrokers: 
(1) Interests of a bare trustee (such as a stockbroker holding shares bought 
by his clients) or custodian trustee and any interests of potential 
beneficiaries; 
(2) Interests held as security for the purpose of a transaction, in the 
ordinary course of their business by registered dealers; and 
(3) Interests in securities of a registered dealer, exempt dealer, investment 
adviser or exempt investment adviser, arising by virtue of the fact that 
they are entitled to dispose of those interests resulting from a written 
agreement to manage investments, are exempt from disclosure. 
However they must disclose these interests if they are registered holders 
of the shares. 
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Penalties for Breach 
For a number of offences, the Ordinance provides for sentences of up to 




Corporate officers, directors and substantial shareholders have been 
regarded as insiders since they always possess certain inside information related to 
their companies. Academicians and regulatory bodies have been interested in the 
trading by these insiders to see whether they can easily make profit and violate the 
securities regulations. The answer to this question has important implication for 
efficient market hypothesis: under the strong form of the hypothesis, share prices have 
reflected all relevant information, whether it is publicly or privately available. Thus, no 
abnormal profits could have been made from insider trading. However, the results of 
some studies are controversial and the profitability of insider trading is not clear-cut. 
Research on Overseas Stock Market 
Studies by Rogoff (1964), Glass (1966), Lorie-Niederhoffer (1968) and 
Scholes (1972) showed that insiders can outperform the market while Driscoll (1956) 
and Wu (1963) found no evidence of successful trading by insiders. Rogoff examined 
45 companies with insider buy (3 or more insider buys and no insider sell in a single 
month) and concluded that the returns on these companies in the following 6 months 
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were 9.5% on average over the market. Glass obtained similar result by studying 14 
different calendar months and picked up 8 companies with the greatest excess of 
insider buys to insider sells within a month. He found that there was a 10% excess 
return over the market in the 7 months following intensive buying. Scholes looked at 
the secondary offerings. He concluded that the 1% decline in the residuals of the 
securities is due to the belief that the issuer had inside information of an adverse 
nature. Lone and Niederhoffer investigated stock performance in the 6 months 
subsequent to the month where there were at least 2 or more insider buys than sells. 
Results showed that the securities were more likely to go up than to decline，and vice 
versa. On the other hand, Wu could not find any relationship between insider trading 
and subsequent stock price performance. Driscoll studied the insider trading prior to 
dividend changes and concluded that there were more insider buys than sells in the 6 
months prior to dividend decreased. 
A further study by Jaffe (1974) showed that insiders do possess special 
information. An initial sample consisting of the 200 largest securities from the Chicago 
Research in Security Prices were picked and price movement of 5 random months 
were studied between 1962 and 1968. The month was regarded as of net purchase or 
sell if the number of purchasers or sellers was greater. These samples were further 
classified as intensive buy/sell if there were at least 3 more insider purchase/sell in a 
month. Results showed that insiders could forecast the price movement in the near 
future better than that of in the distant future. Nevertheless, after adjustment for 
transaction cost of 2% for both purchase and sell, only the intensive trading sample 
with 8-months holding periods were making statistically large return. It was also not 
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suggested that there was no relationship between the insider profit and the intensity of 
the trading. 
The existence of excess return by insiders was also confirmed by Finnerty 
(1976) in his more in-depth study of 30,000 transactions in NYSE during January 1969 
to December 1972. He divided the transactions into buy (9,602) and sell (21,487) and 
found that insiders can outperform the market in both cases at the 10% significance 
level. 
Since insiders are closely monitored by many investors, insider trading 
always trigger transactions in the same direction by these "outsiders" and thus may 
create abnormal return to the insiders. Besides, price movement may also be due to 
the disclosure of specific news, which the insiders might be privy, after the insider 
trading. However, the study by Palmon (1985) using 68 listed companies from the 
American Stock Exchange showed that much of the insiders' profit could be explained 
by the follow-up activities of the "outsiders" rather than the announcement of specific 
news after the insider trading. Thus, this also violates the semi-strong form of market 
efficiency which states that all publicly available information should have been fully 
reflected by the stock price. It was further concluded that there was no positive 
relationship between the direction, both buy and sell, of large transactions and the 
content of subsequent news disclosure. 
Zaman (1988) referred the abnormal profit made by insiders as "insider 
trading profit" while the profit earned by outsiders through simply follow suit as 
"insiders trading anomaly" in his study. After Finnety (1976) had concluded that 
40 
abnormal returns were higher for the shares with smaller size, larger earnings and 
larger dividends or higher earnings/price (e/p) ratios, Zaman found that the cause of 
such "insiders trading anomaly" was due to the size and e/p effects. Adjusting these 
effects reduce the returns by outsiders by half, from 0.5% to 0.3% per month for a 12-
month horizon. The additional of the assumed 2% transaction cost makes outsiders 
profit zero or even negative while the insiders can still make a 3 - 3.5% profit annually. 
Therefore, the abnormal returns by both the insiders and outsiders may not be 
attributable to the presence of insider information and semi-strong form market 
inefficiency, respectively. 
It is also interesting that there is an information hierarchy and relative 
performance among different sub-groups of insiders: chief executive officers (CEO), 
directors (DIR), beneficial owners (BO) and vice presidents (VP). It is due to an 
unequal access to non-public information. Nunn, Madden and Gombola (1983) 
collected 1,456 transactions on open market transactions from February 1974 through 
August 1978 from the Insiders' Chronicle (it contains all open market transactions 
worth $10,000 or more from the Securities and Exchange Commission's Official 
Summary). The data was further classified into these 4 different sub-group of insiders. 
The performance of the 12-month period after the purchase/sell was compared with 
the 12-month period before the transaction. The results showed that all the 4 groups 
performed significantly better in purchase but the post-purchase cumulative average 
residuals for CEO and DIR are higher than those of BO and VP. It is because CEO 
and DIR appear to have better access to non-public information at the very high 
management level. However, the results were mixed in sale. The cumulative average 
residuals of DIR are decidedly negative and that of BO are slightly negative. On the 
I 
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other hand, it is positive for both CEO and VP. On a comparative basis, DIR and BO 
out-performed CEO and VP in sale. Nunn, Madden and Gombola suggested that the 
selling by CEO and VP may not be due to unfavorable insider information, but rather 
two other major reasons: (1) diversification: CEO and VP usually get part of their 
remuneration in the form of stock options of their own company and thus have to sell 
the share to diversify the risk; (2) CEO and VP are highly visible to the public and they 
do not want to show their 'no confidence' vote on their own company. 
A comprehensive study of 60,000 insider transactions during 1975 to 1981 
was conducted by Seyhun (1985) confirming that insiders do make abnormal returns 
and different insiders have differences in the quality of insider information. The 
chairman of the board of directors and o伍cer-directors are performing better than 
officers and shareholders in predicting the future abnormal stock price movement. In 
line with the results of the study by Zaman in 1988, Seyhun concluded that there is also 
no significant abnormal return for outsiders after the transaction cost. An additional 
cost, bid-ask spread was also examined. Since profitable trading by informed insiders 
imposes abnormal losses on all opposing traders, market makers, a sort of opposing 
traders, have to charge a larger bid-ask spread to offset this systematic losses to 
insiders. As a percentage of stock price, the expected losses to insiders and firm size 
are negatively correlated. This means that the expected loss to insiders are reflected in 
the bid-ask spread since smaller companies have larger bid-ask spreads. Taking into 
consideration of this additional cost of trading, the "insiders trading anomaly" as 
defined by Zamam (1988) concerning the efficient markets hypothesis will disappear. 
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Watchdog Report bv Credit Lvonnais 
� 
It is obvious that insider trading has been a popular topic for the 
academicians in the Western world. However, there has been limited study in Hong 
Kong on this subject even though it is widely perceived that insider trading is very 
common here. With the recent development of the Hong Kong stock market and the 
open-door policy of China, more and more overseas investors have been attracted to 
participate in the financial market of Hong Kong. According to a recent study 
conducted by the SEHK, issuers, merchant bankers and investors are paying great 
attention to the regulatory system of the stock market of Hong Kong. The October 
1994 issue of the Watchdog Report by Credit Lyonnais Securities showed that insiders 
do outperform the market and outsiders can imitate directors' activities to achieve 
systematic out-performance. Results showed that an outsider bought the top 10 stocks 
in which directors were the heaviest net aggregate buyers over the previous year at 
calendar year end could have outperformed the Hang Sang Index by 52% for the 
period of January 1993 to September 1994 or 4% for January 1994 to September 
1994. A fund manager can easily gain 3% in absolute terms by following the top 15 
insiders' buys for the 9 months in 1994 verses the 22% market decline. 
Since insider trading has such significant implications for both regulatory 
body as well as the market participants, it is worthwhile to further study the situation in 
Hong Kong in a more systematic way. This is in fact the primarily objective of this 
project. The details of the design, analysis, results and interpretation of this study will 






According to the SDIO, substantial shareholders, directors or chief 
executives of a listed company are required to disclose changes in their holding in the 
shares of that listed company under certain conditions. Such disclosures are required 
to make to the SEHK and the listed company. Sample of the disclosure form for 
individual substantial shareholder, corporate substantial shareholder and director/chief 
executive are attached in Appendix-1 to Appendix-3 respectively. 
For the purpose of this study, the following information, among others, are 
contained in the disclosure: 
(1) the name of the listed company; 
(2) details of the person making the disclosure; 
(3) the date of event leading to the need for disclosure; 
. ‘ . 
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(4) previous shareholding; 
(5) present shareholding; and 
(6) name under which the subject shares are registered. 
The source of data came from the disclosure made to the SEHK pursuant 
to the SDIO. All the disclosure during the period September 1991 to August 1993 are 
included in the sample of this study except under the following conditions: 
(1) a person is also required to disclose the shareholding in a listed 
company of another person if the first mentioned person is: 
(a) the spouse of the second mentioned person; 
(b) the parent of the second mentioned person who is under the age of 
eighteen; or 
- (c) controlling more than one-third of the voting rights of the second 
mentioned person. 
To avoid duplicated data, any disclosure by the second 




(2) those disclosures related to change in holding percentage due to the 
dilution effect of right issue rather than change in absolute number of 
shares held; 
(3) disclosure in relation to those listed companies which are not listed 
throughout the period of our study (i.e. from September 1991 to 
August 1993); 
(4) disclosure in relation to those listed companies which has zero monthly 
turnover in any month of the period under study; or 
(5) disclosure in relation to those listed companies whose data are not 
available in any one or more month during the period under study. 
Definition of Insider Activities Index (“lAT) 
Throughout our study, lAI is computed as a measure for the frequency of 
insider's activities in the shares of a listed company relative to the total market 
activities in that stock. lAI in respect of a listed company is defined as the ratio of 
total volume of insider's activities in respect of the listed company to the total market 
turnover for the same period of time. To avoid decimal places, the ratio is multiplied 




lAI = (lAV / TMV) X 100,000 
where lAV = Total volume of Insider's Activities in a listed 
stock in a specified period 
TMV = Total market turnover for the same stock in the 
same period 
Design of the Study 
In this study, insider's activities are investigated according to four different 
dimensions: Industry Type; Company Size; Seasonal Effect; and Ownership 
Concentration. The respective methodology is set out as below: 
(1) Industry Type 
The sample is divided into seven categories of industries: Finance; Utilities; 
Properties; Consolidated Enterprises; Industrials; Hotels; and Others. Each of them 
contains a set of companies. Each company carries a measure of lAI. An estimation 
of mean level of lAI is to be computed for each industry. A test for significance 
difference in mean will be carried out for each pair of industries. 
(2) Company Size 
Two dimensions for measurement are employed: Capitalization and Total 
Assets. These two attributes are basically similar indicators for Company Size but 
Capitalization also take into consideration of the liquidity of the stock. They are 
defined as follows: 
X 
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Capitalization = Share price x total issued share capital as at fiscal year end 
of 1992 
Total Assets = Total assets value as at fiscal year end of 1992 
The sample contains companies which fall into different ranges of size and 
each carries a measure of lAI. An estimation of mean level oflAI is to be computed 
for each category of company size. A test for difference in mean will be carried out for 
each pair of categories of company size. 
The companies are divided in accordance with the classification tables in 
Table-3 and Table-4. The division line for each category are arbitrary but after taking 
into consideration of ensuring a more evenly distributed number of observations in 
each category. 
(3) Seasonal Effect 
The sample is divided into twelve calendar months, each of them contains a 
set of companies. Each company carries a measure of lAI. An estimation of mean 
level of lAI is to be computed for each calendar month. A test for significance 




CAPITALIZATION (CAP: in HK$'000) 
C a t e g o r y C a p i t a l i s a t i o n Range No. of Observations 
‘ 1 0<CAP< 200,000^ 47 
2 200,000 < CAP < = 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ^ 
3 500,000 < CAP <= 2,000,000 HI 
4 2,000,000< CAP <= 8 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 3 7 
~ ~ 5 8,000,000 < CAP <= 20,000,000 10 
6 20,000,000 < CAP 18 
TABLE-4 
ASSETS SIZE (AZ: inHK$'000) 
C a t e g o r y A s s e t Size Range No. of Observations 
^ 0< AZ<= 300,000 46 
2 300,000 < A Z < = 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 115 
3 ‘1 ,000,000 < A Z < = 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ^ 
4: 3,000,000 < AZ<=10,000,000 46 
^ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 <AZ 32 
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(4) Ownership Concentration 
The sample is divided into five categories of Ownership Concentration 
according to the classification table (Table-5) below. Ownership Concentration (OC) 
is defined as the percentage of total number of shares held by the top ten shareholders 
as compared to the total issued share capital. Each category contains a set of 
companies. Each company carries a measure of lAI. An estimation of mean level of 
lAI is to be computed for each category of Ownership Concentration. A test for 
difference in mean will be carried out for each pair of categories. 
TABLE-5 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
CategoryOwnership Concentration Range No. of Observations 
^ “ r ^ ^ “ ‘ 0% < OC <= 5% 47 
- 2 5% < OC <= 20% 24 
3 20% < OC <= 40% 41 
1 40% < OC <= 60% Ts 




RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Industry Type 
The results of this study is attached in Appendix-4 to Appendix-7. For the 
analysis on the Industry Type, categories 2 and 6 (Utilities and Hotels) show very low 
mean level of lAI (Appendix-4). It means both industries attract less insider dealing 
activities than other industries. In the t-test table, Utilities shows significantly lower 
level of insider's activities relative to Industries 1, 3, 4 and 5 (Finance, Properties, 
Consolidated Enterprises and Industrials respectively) with t-value larger than two. By 
the same reason, Hotels is significantly lower in insider trading level than Industries 3’ 
4 and 5. There is no significant difference among other combinations of Industries. 
Utilities sector has been regarded as defensive and conservative. Due to its 
long-term stable earnings, not only individual investors but pension funds and unit 
trusts have great interest in this sector. With this wide-spread interest among different 
investors and the large market capitalization, the liquidity of utilities stocks are very 
high. Since the total turnover is high, it is not surprising that the lAI for Utilities is 




On the other hand, the daily turnover for the Hotels sector is not as high as 
that of Utilities. Thus, the small lAI of the Hotels sector suggests that the insider's 
activities is itself less active than those of other industries. 
Company Size 
In the results of Company Size as shown in Appendix-5, Category 6 of 
Capitalization shows very low lAI. It is also significantly lower than those of 
Categories 1, 2 and 3. It means those companies with capitalization larger than 
HK$20 billions are less active in insider's activities than those with capitalization less 
than HK$2 billions. The trend of lAI decreases along with the increase in 
Capitalization. 
Surprisingly, the results is not the same in Assets Size as that of 
Capitalization. Categories 3 and 5 (companies with assets size between HK$l-3 
billions and larger than HK$10 billions respectively) have lower estimated mean than 
the others. However, only Category 2 (companies with assets size between HK$300 
millions and HK$1 billion) shows significantly higher level of insider trading activity 
than categories 3 and 5. Even though there is no obvious trend in the relationship 
between Assets Size and lAI, it is believed that the lAI decreases along with the 
increase in Assets Size. The estimated mean for Category 1 is 28.1 while it is only 
10.7 for Category 5. If a different way of categorisation for Assets Size is used 
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instead, the trend will be more obvious. There is no other significant difference in any 
combination of Categories since all other t-value are less than two. 
Companies with small market capitalization or assets size are considered to 
be small businesses. It is very common in Hong Kong that the major owners of these 
small businesses always participate actively in the management and daily activities of 
the company. As a result, they can easily get the first hand information related to the 
company and trade their own company's stock based on these price sensitive 
information. Thus, the insider trading activities will be more active for small size 
companies. Furthermore, the daily total turnover of most of these small size 
companies are usually extremely thin. The trading by these insiders, even in a small 
absolute amount, can constitute a substantial percentage to the total turnover. As a 
result, the lAI for these small size companies is usually high. On the contrary, the daily 
turnover of large size companies are usually high. One reason is the participation of 
investment funds. With a large denominator, the lAI will usually be smaller. 
Seasonal Effect 
It is widely believed that insiders are in a better position to know the 
earnings result of their company prior to the company's announcement to the public. 
Thus，insider trading is supposed to be more active before the announcement of the 
company's earnings result. Since the fiscal year-end of most Hong Kong companies 
are in December and they report full-year earnings in late March and interim earnings 
in late September respectively, insider trading before March and September should be 
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more active. According to the Listing Rules of the SEHK, directors of a listed 
company are restricted from trading the share of their companies one month before 
reporting earnings. As a result, there should be a one-month lead time and insider 
trading should have been very active in February and August if our deduction is 
correct. However, the result of our study shows different scenario. As shown in 
Appendix-6, the mean level of insider trading activities are lower in May and August, 
but only August is significantly lower than the mean level of March. There is no 
particular seasonal effect in our findings. 
It may be possible that most of the fiscal year-end of the companies in our 
data set are not in December and thus do not report earnings in March and September. 
It may also be that insiders do not want to take the advantage to trade their shares 
before the announcement of results since it will be too obvious and sensitive for the 
regulatory bodies to monitor their activities. 
Ownership Concentration 
Although there is no significant pattern in the seasonal effect oflAI, there is 
a positive relationship between the Ownership Concentration and the insider trading 
activities level, as shown in Appendix-7. The larger the percentage owned by the top 
ten shareholders, the higher the level of insider's activities is. The activities level of 
Category 5, the top ten shareholders own more than 60% of the companies, is 
significantly higher than those of Categories 1 and 2，the top ten shareholders own less 
than 20% of the companies. At the same time, the activities level of Category 4, the 
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top ten shareholders own more than 40% but less than 60% of the companies, is 
significantly higher than that of Category 2. 
The higher the Ownership Concentration, the less the number of shares is 
outstanding in the stock market held by non-substantial shareholders. Thus, the 
liquidity of this share is low. Since the denominator of total trading volume is small, 
the lAI will be big even for the same insider trading volume. In addition to that, the 
more the substantial shareholders own the company, the more predominant control in 
the hands of the substantial shareholders will be. Thus, they will have access to price 
sensitive information and more prone to engage in insider's activities. 
In conclusion, the estimation of how active the insider's activities of a 
company, lAI, is affected by both the insider's activities volume itself and the total 
trading volume. Those companies with large market capitalization and high liquidity 
will usually have a high trading volume. Thus, they are more likely to have low lAI. 
No wonder why the larger the size of a company, the less active the insider trading is. 
It can explain the small lAI of Utilities sector while the low lAI of Hotels sector is due 
to their less insider activities. The seasonal effect is not significant but for August. 
The lAI is lower in August and is significantly different from that of March. Insiders 
just do not want to create any unnecessary suspicion by the outsiders or regulators 
through trading their own stocks right before the result announcement. Finally, the 
insiders are more active for those companies with a high ownership concentration ratio 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion 
The trading of own company's shares by substantial shareholders and 
directors has been one of the major concerns of market practitioners. There have been 
a lot of in-depth studies on this topic conducted in the US. However, the results are 
still controversial on whether these insiders, substantial shareholders and directors, can 
really outperform the market. Compared to other developed stock markets, Hong 
Kong may be even worse by virtual of the overlapping of the ownership and 
management of a company as well as the short history of the regulatory system on 
insider trading. This is evidenced by the large number of insider trading activities that 
result in the abnormal movement of the share price. In this regard, there are much 
room for improvement in insider dealing legislation in order to protect the investing 
public better. A comprehensive understanding of the insider trading activities in the 
stock market of Hong Kong undoubtedly will help the SEHK and SFC to keep Hong 
Kong's high integrity standard up and maintain her reputable status as an international 
financial centre in the future. 
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The results of this study confirm the intuitive belief that the smaller the 
company size, the more active the insiders' activities will be. At the same time, the 
insiders' activities level is always high for those companies with high ownership 
concentration. For companies with small company size and high ownership 
concentration, their daily turnover is usually low. Thus, the volume of insiders' 
activities constitutes a very high percentage of the total market turnover and thus a 
high index for the estimation of insider trading level. Surprisingly, no seasonal effect 
was found. 
Recommendations for Further Studies 
Since insider trading activities may involve the unequal access to privy 
information related to a listed company by insiders and non-insiders, it is suspicious 
that if insiders can outperform the market index or even ‘manipulate’ the share price. 
A more in-depth study along this dimension is recommended because the results will 
help those outsiders to see whether any trading strategy can be formed by following 
these insider trading activities and more importantly, regulatory body may be interested 
in looking into whether there is any breach of insider dealing ordinance. It is also 
worthwhile to find out how much abnormal returns over the market index these 
insiders can make on the whole and the relationship between the abnormal returns and 
those dimensions included in this study: industry type, company size and ownership 
concentration. As a result, it will be clear that which industry type, how big the 
company size and which level of ownership concentration will have higher abnormal 
returns. 
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In addition, since directors and substantial shareholders may have different 
access to the sensitive information of their company, it is useful to compute the 
abnormal returns on their insider trading activities respectively to see who is a better 
insider. The abnormal returns from overall buying activities and overall selling 
activities by these insiders can also be calculated. It is expected that one side of these 
trading may do better than the other. The reason is most of the insider's purchase are 
based on the possession of insider information while for those who sell, there are many 
reasons other than knowing any bad news related to that company and expecting the 
share price to drop, e. g. for diversification or raising cash as mentioned in the study by 
Nann, Madden and Gombola in 1983. 
We hope that this study can arouse more attention among the investors and 
regulatory bodies on insiders' activities. Furthermore，we hope that this study will 
stimulate more comprehensive studies on this topic in the future. Only when the high 
integrity standard is maintained, the stock market of Hong Kong can uphold its 
competitive edge as compared to other emerging markets in attracting more foreign 








D I S C L O S U R E O F I N T E R E S T ^ ^ 
No statutory form has been prescribed under the Ordinance. This notice form is provided for your use by the 
Securities and Futures Commission. 
You should, however, note that your statutory obligations are determined by the Ordinance not by the notice form 
？ W h e n making your disclosure, therefore, you must satisfy yourself as to the requirements ot the 
Ordinance and, if in doubt, you should seek appropriate legal advice. You are free to make the required disclosures 
in some other written form. 
EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR DIRECTORS AND CHIEF EXECUTIVES ON COMPLETING THIS NOTICE FORM 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
References to the Ordinance are references to the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance (Cap. 396). 
This notice form is to be completed by directors, chief executives and shadow directors of a listed company when disclosing all their j 
interests in the securities of their company and its associated companies. It is also to be used by directors etc. when disclosing a notifiable 
interest in relevant share capital (i.e. 10% or more of the voting shares) for the purposes of Part II of the Ordinance. . 
The term "substantial shareholder" is not defined in the Ordinance but is used in this notice form and these notes for descriptive purposes 
only. A substantial shareholder is someone who has an interest in 10% or more of the relevant share capital concerned (i.e. voting shares 
of the company). 
For record purposes it is advisable to keep a copy of all disclosures that are made. 
If any of your interests in'the relevant share capital of the listed company are held as a result of a section 9 acquisition agreement then 
you are advised to take legal advice as no standard notice form is provided by the Securities and Futures Commission for the purposes of 
disclosure. 
If you have insufficient space, complete your disclosures on a separate sheet - a photocopy of an uncompleted page 2 could be used 
provided that it is signed and clearly marked "Additional Sheet". 
When completing this notice form use block letters, preferably typewritten. 
In cases of ambiguity staff of the Slock Exchange of Hong Kong (the ‘SEHK,) may telephone you for clarification. 
If you have any queries about the Ordinance or your obligations thereunder you should consult your legal or other professional adviser. 
The fact that you do not have a!I the information required by the notice form should not prevent you from filing the notice form if you are 
aware you are under a duty to disclose. Information not currently available should be p r q v i d ^ when it becomes available. 
You must always complete the entire form, particularly paragraph 10’ even if you are only supplying details required by section 7(6) and 
there has been no disclosable change in the size of your interests. 
FILING REQUIREMENTS 
A signed copy of this notice form must be filed with the SEHK using one of the following methods:— 
By Post — The SDI Unit-
Compliance Division 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
G.P.O. Box 10023 
Hong Kong 
This is dedicated P.O. Box for the SDI Unit only. You should not use the general SEHK P.O. Box. 
By Hand — The SDI Unit 
. Compliance Division 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
Tower I & II, Exchange Square 
Central, Hong Kong 
By Fax — Fax No.: 8456328 
For security reasons, no other SEHK fax number should be used. You are asked to pay particular attention to ensuring the 
proper fax number is used. 
Telephone confirmations of fax notification can be obtained from 5233799. You are asked to restrict use of this service to 
significant or price sensitive notifications. 
A signed copy of this notice form must also be filed with the company referred to at paragraph 2 of the noiice fooi丨 at its registered office 
or principal place of business in Hong Kmig. You should take every reasonably practicable step to ensure that the notice form reaches the 
SEHK first. 
You have five days next following the day the duty to disclose arose to comply with the Ordinance. 
INSTRUCTIONS ON GOMPLETING THE NOTICE FORM 
The box marked "Ref. N o . " can be used for your own record purposes. 
1. Paragraph 1 
This stateirTent is required by sections 15(2) and 28(6) of the Ordinance. 
2. Paragraph 2 
y 3 u shoulTfill in the full name of the company of which you are a director or chief executive and the stock code, if you have it. 
3. Paragraph 3 
You should identify yourself by giving your full name. 
A contact telephone number should be provided so that the SEHK can quickly clarify any matter arising oul of any of the 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4. K y o u T r e a substantial shareholder you should also complete, as appropriate, paragraphs 5. 6. 7. 8 and 9. Relevant share 
capital is defined in the Ordinance and means a listed company's share capital carrying the right to vote. 
5. Paragraph 5 
Complete this paragraph only if you are a substantial shareholder. 
In order to disclose the reason for disclosure at 5(b). tick the box number corresponding to one or more of i j e following 
rensons. For example if you acquire shares which increase the notifiable percentage level then you would tick the boxes 
numbered “ 1 " and “ 3 ” . I f y o u r acqu is i t ion is as a resul t o f a f am i l y member acqu i r i ng shares y o u w o u l d t i ck the boxes 
numbered " 1 " , “ 3 ” and " 4 " . 
You should note that if you tick the box numbered ‘‘8” then you can proceed to paragraph 10 of the form. 
, . . , Box Number 
Reason for disclosure 
Acqu i s i t i on /d i sposa l o f an interest in relevant share capi ta l o f l is ted company g i v i n g r ise to a du ty to disclose. 
In i t i a l d isc losure ‘ ‘ 2 , ’ 
Change in percentage level of notifiable interest . . 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital by a family member (i.e. spouse or children under 18) 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital by a corporation subject to section 8 ( 2 ) . � and (4) ) 
(see note 1) ‘‘g,. 
Disclosure of particulars required by section 7(6) (see note 2) .口，， 
Change in particulars required by section 7(6) (see note 2) ..g,, 
Cease to have notifiable interest 
S o n 8(2) (3) and (4) deems you to be interested in shares in the relevant share capital of a listed company that are held by 
a corporation the directors of which are accustomed to act in accordance with your directions or in which you can exercise one-
third or more of the voting rights. 
Th^piniculars required by section 7(6) of the Ordinance are the names of and the number of shares held by the registered 
shareholders. 
6. S S u l c f disclose the name of the person or company with whom you have a joint interest in shares. You should note that 
the person or company with whom you have the joint interest has to make separate disclosures of their own if they have a 
notifiable interest. 
7. Y o u S d disclose the interests held by your family members. This is so that the company concerned and the SEHK can 
distinguish between the shares that you hold absolutely and those that you are deemed to hold as a result of your family 
relationship. The family member/s concerned will have to make a separate disclosure if the shares they hold or are deemed to 
hold exceed the notifiable percentage (i.e.10%). 
8. S s S r y o u r interest in relevant share capital held through other corporations pursuant to section 8 of the Ordinance. If you 
have any doubts about the consequences of section 8 of the Ordinance you should consult your legal adviser. If these 
corporations' interests exceed the notifiable percentage of 10% they will have to file separate disclosures. 
9. ThTord inaLe requires you to disclose the names and addresses of the registered shareholders of the relevant share capital in 
which you are interested i.e. the names and addresses of those that hold the voting shares in the listed company disclosed at 
paragraph 10. If you do not have these particulars this should not prevent you from filing your notification. These particulars 
can be sent to the SEHK and the company concerned when you obtain them. 
10. ？ o u S t dfsclose all your interests in securities of the listed company and its associated corporations. If you are a substantial 
shareholder it is here that you disclose the size of that interest. You are referred to the Schedule to the Ordinance and section 
28 oarticularly If you have any doubt as to what interests have to be disclosed you should consult your legal adviser, 
immediately Section 31(1) states that a director or chief executive is taken to be interested in the shares or debentures 丨n which 
his spouse or child under 18 years of age is interested if they are not themselves a director or chief executive. You should 
disclose those interests in this paragraph. 
In column 10(A) provide the name of the corporation in which the interest subsists. 
In column 10(B) give a description of the class of securities in which you are interested e.g. “1992 10% debentures". 
Columns 10(C) and (D) are self-explanatory. . . , � ^ . 
In column 10(E) you do not have to disclose what type of transaction was involved but you should provide the date and the 
consideration per unit. 
11. Paragraph 11 
From time to time the listed company of which you are a director or chief executive may grant you rights to subscribe for 
securities. Equally, associated corporations of the listed company may grant you rights to subscribe for securities. Paragraph 11 
is to be used to disclose these interests. Part II of the Schedule to the Ordinance sets down the information that has to be _ 
disclosed in this paragraph. Section 31(3) requires directors and chief executives to disclose the grant by the company of a right 
to subscribe for shares in the company to their spouse or child under 18 years of age. You should disclose these matters in this 
paragraph. 
This paragraph also allows you to disclose details of when you exercise or assign rights to subscribe. This information is 
required by Part III of the Schedule. 
YOU SHOULD CHECK THE NOTICE FORM BEFORE SIGNING IT TO MAKE SURE THAT EVERYTHING THAT YOU HAVE 
STATED IS CORRECT. 
6 3 
APPENDIX-2 ^ ^ ^ 
D I S C L O S U R E O F I N T E R E S T ^ V 
No statutory form has been prescribed under the Ordinance. This notice form is provided for your use by the 
Securities and Futures Commission. 
Y'’” should however, note that your statutory obligations are determined by the Ordinance not by the notice form 
in some other written form. 
EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR CORPORATE SUBSTANTIAL S H A P P ^ n r DFRS ON COMPLETING THIS NOTICE FORM 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
References to the Ordinance are references to the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance (Cap. 396). 
This notice form is to be completed by corporations/companies when making their disclosures of a notifiable interest in relevant share 
capital of the listed company disclosed at paragraph 1 of the notice form. 
This notice form is to be used by corporations/companies to notify the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (the “SEHK”）and the listed 
company concerned of, amongst other things, the following:— 
(i) An interest in 10% or more of the relevant share capital (i.e. voting shares) of a listed company. 
； I 二 二 = = 二 = 二 ; t h a t resuus in you crossing over a . h o l e percentage 誦 b e r 
(e.g. 10.9% increases to 11.1%). 
of the company). 
For record purposes it is advisable to keep a copy of all disclosures that are made. 
You should note that the duties of disclosure of substantial shareholders, in most cases, have to be fulfilled within 5 days next following-
the day upon which those duties arise. In cases of doubt, legal advice should be taken. 
If anv of the interests in relevant share capital of the listed company are held as a result of a section 9 acquisition agree.^nt then you are 
a d v I L L take legal alTvii as no standard' notice form is provided by the Securities and Futures Co細丨ss丨on for the purposes of 
disclosure. 
If you have insufficient space, complete your disclosures on a separate sheet — a photocopy of an uncompleted page 2 could be used 
provided that it is signed and clearly marked "Additional Sheet • 
When completing this notice form use block letters, preferably typewritten. 
In cases of ambiguity staff of the SEHK may telephone you for clarification. 
二 ; a r e 
l i a r f y o L arfunder "a duty to disclose. Information not currently available should be provided when .t becomes available. 
You must always complete the entire form, particularly paragraph 5. even if you are only supplying details required by section 7(6) and 
there has been no disclosable change in the size of your interests. 
This notice form is only to be completed by a person properly authorized by the corporation/company making disclosure. 
FTLING REQUIREMENTS 
A signed copy of this notice must be filed with the SEHK using one of the following methods:— 
By Post — The SDI Unit 
Compliance Division 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
G.P.O. Box ！0023 � 
Hong Kong 
This is dedicated P.O. Box for the SDI Unit only. You should not use the general SEHK P.O. Box. 
By Hand — The SDI Unit 
Compliance Division 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
Tower I & II’ Exchange Square 
Central, Hong Kong 
By Fax - Fax No.: 8456328 
For security reasons, no other SEHK fax number should be used. You are asked to pay particular attention to ensuring the 
proper fax number is used. 
Telephone conHrmations of fax notification can be obtained from 5233799. You are asked lo restrict use of this service to 
significant or price sensitive notifications. 
A signed copy of this notice form must 些 be filed with the company referred lo at paragraph 1 of the notice form at its registered office 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































INSTRUCTIONS ON COMPLETING THE NOTICE FORM 
The box marked "Ref. N o . " can be used for your own record purposes. 
1. ？ J m p l l M e name of the company and its stock code. The stock code can be obtained from the SEHK or from the company 
concerned. Even if the stock code is not known the notice form should still be completed and filed. 
2. DescHbfthe relevant share capital to which the notification relates. A small number of companies listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong have two classes of share capital, each with voting rights (i.e. "A’’ and " B " shares). If the 
corporation/company is a substantial shareholder of both classes of share capital then two separate notices should be completed. 
3. Ind address of the corporation/company making disclosure of its interests must be set out in full in English. 
4. ^ f ^ S ^ d i s c l o s e the reason for disclosure at 4(b), tick the box number corresponding to one or more of the following 
reasons. For example, if you acquire shares which increase the notifiable percentage level then you would tick the boxes 
numbered “ 1 ” and "3" . If your acquisition is as a result of a company’,，in which you are interested pursuant to section 8’ 
acquiring shares you would tick the boxes numbered "1" , " 3 " and "4". 
You should note that if you tick the box numbered “ 7 ” then, apart from signing, you do not need to complete the remainder of 
the notice form. 
Reason for disclosure Box Number-
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital of listed company giving rise to a duty to disclose. “ I ” 
“ 2 ” 
Initial disclosure 
‘‘3’， 
Change in percentage level of notifiable interest 
. Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital by a corporation subject to section 8(2), (3) and (4) “ 4 ” 
(see note 1) 
“5” 
Disclosure of particulars required by section 7(6) (see note 2) 
“ 6 ” 
Change in particulars required by section 7(6) (see note 2) 
" 7 " 
Cease to have notifiable interest 
Sec'Ln 8(2) (3) and (4) deems you to be interested in shares in the relevant share capital of a listed company that are held by 
a corporation the directors of which are accustomed to act in accordance with your directions or in which you can exercise one-
third or more of the voting rights. 
Thrparticulars required by section 7(6) of the Ordinance are the names of and the number of shares held by the registered 
shareholders. 
A^Hnterests in relevant share capital including those that the corporation/company is deemed to be interested in as a result of 
section 8 (i.e. corporate interests) are to be disclosed. If this is an initial disclosure paragraph 5(b) is not applicable. 
6 Paragraph 6 
The "name of the person or company with whom a joint interest in shares is held should be disclosed. It should be noted that the 
person or company with whom the joint interest is held has to make separate disclosures of their own if they have a notifiable 
interest. 
7. Paragraph 7 
Disclose ihe interests in relevant share capital held through other corporations pursuant to section 8 of the Ordinance. If you 
have any doubts about the consequences of section 8 of the Ordinance legal advice should be taken. If these corporations' 
interests exceed the notifiable percentage they will have to make separate disclosures. 
8. Paragraph 8 . . , . , 
The Ordinance requires the disclosure of the names and addresses of the registered shareholders of the shareholding m the listed 
company disclosed at paragraph 5(a). Lack of knowledge of these particulars should not prevent a notice form being filed. 
These particulars can be sent to the SEHK and the company concerned when they are obtained. 
YOU MUST SIGN THE NOTICE FORM AND INDICATE IN WHAT CAPACITY YOU ARE SIGNING IT. 
YOU SHOULD CHECK THE NOTICE FORM BEFORE SIGNING IT TO MAKE SURE THAT EVERYTHING THAT YOU HAVE 




D I S C L O S U R E O F I N T E R E S T 
No statutory form has been prescribed under the Ordinance. This notice form is provided for your use by the 
Securities and Futures Commission. 
You should, however, note that your statutory obligations are determined by the Oj"d乂ance = by the notice form 
rrovuled. When making your disclosure, therefore, you must satisfy yourself as to the 二 丄 f the 
Ordinance and, if in doubt, you should seek appropriate legal advice. You are free to make the required disclosures 
in some other written form. 
EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDERS ON COMPLETING THIS NOTICE FORM 
G E N E R A L INFORMATION 
References to the Ordinance are references to the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance (Cap. 396) . 
This notice form is to be completed by individuals when making their disclosures of a notifiable interest in the relevant, share capital of the 
listed"company disclosed at paragraph 1 of the notice form. 
If you are a director or chief executive do not complete this notice form. A separate notice form is available and should be used. 
This notice form is to be used by individuals to notify the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (the " S E H K " ) and the listed company 
concerned of , amongst other things, the following:— 
(i) An interest in 10% or more of the relevant share capital ( i .e . voting shares) of a listed company. 
(ii) Ceasing to have a notifiable interest (i.e. dropping below 10%). '：：, 
(iii) An increase or decrease in the percentage level of your holdings that results in you crossing over a whole percentage number 
(e.g. 10.9% increases to 11.1%). 
The term "substantial shareholder” is not defined in the Ordinance but is used in this notice form and these notes for descriptive p.jrposes 
L l y T s u b f r n T a T s t r e h o l d e r is someone who has an interest in 10% or more of the relevant share capital concerned (丨:e. yot.ng shares 
of the company). 
For record purposes, it is advisable to keep a copy of all disclosures that are made. 
You should note that the duties of disclosure of substantial shareholders, in most cases, have to be fulfilled within 5 days next following 
the day upon which those duties arise. In cases of doubt, legal advice should be taken. 
If any of your interests in the relevant share capital of the listed company are held as a result of a^section 9 acquisition a g r e e m e n ^ h e n 
y o r a r e a d v i s e d t take legal advice as no standard notice form is provided by the Securities and Futures Co議丨ss丨on for the purposes of 
disclosure. 
If you have insufficient space, complete your disclosures on a separate sheet - a photocopy of an uncompleted page 2 could be used 
provided that it is signed and clearly marked "Additional Sheet". 
When completing this notice form use block letters, preferably typewritten. 
In cases of ambiguity' staff of the SEHK may telephone you for clarification. 
If vou have any queries about the Ordinance or your obligations thereunder you should consult your l e g a l � ;丨她 e r Prof^ss力al 二 
Yhe L t L you do n i have all the information required by the notice form should not prevent you from filmg the not ce form if you are 
aware v o r a r e under a duty to disclose. Information not currently available should be provided when U becomes available. 
You must always complete the entire form, particularly paragraph 5’ even if you are only supplying details required by section 7(6) and 
there has been no disclosable change in the size of your interests. 
FILING REQUIREMENTS • 
A signed copy of this notice form must be filed with the SEHK using one of the following m e t h o d s : -
By Post — The SDI Unit � 
Compliance Division 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
G.P .O. Box 10023 
Hong Kong 
This is dedicated P.O. Box for the SD! Unit only. You should not use the general SEHK P.O. Box. 
By Hand — The SDI Unit 
Compliance Division 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
Tower I & II’ Exchange Square 
Central, Hong Kong 
By Fax — Fax No. : 8456328 
For security reasons, no other SEHK fax number should be used. You are asked to pay particular attention to ensuring the 
proper fax number is used. 
Telephone confirmations of fax notification can he obtained from 5233799. You are asked lo restrict use of this service to 
significant or price sensitive notifications. 
A sicned copy of this notice form must also be filed with the company referred to at paragraph 1 of the notice form at its registered off ice 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































INSTRUCTIONS ON COMPLETING THE NOTICE FORM 
The box marked "Ref. N o . " can be used for your own record purposes. 
1. S ^ e name of the company and its stock code. The stock code can be obtained J o m the SEHK or from the company 
concerned. Even if the stock code is not known the notice form should still be completed and filed. 
2. S i b f t h e relevant share capital to which the notification relates. A small number of companies listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong “ � c l a s s e ' s of share capital, each with voting rights (i.e. " A ” and “ B ” shares). If you are a substantial 
shareholder of both classes of share capital then you should complete two separate notices. 
• .: 
3. Paragraph 3 
Complete your name and address. 
. . 
4. S l f ^ d i s c l o s e the reason for disclosure at 4(b), tick the box number corresponding to one or more of the f o l l ^ i n g 
reasons. For example, if you acquire shares which increase the notifiable percentage level then you would t ck the to 
numbered “ 1 ” and “ 3 ” . If your acquisition is as a result of a family member acquiring shares you would tick the boxes 
numbered “ 1 ”， “ 3 ” and " 4 " . 
You should note that if you tick "the box numbered “ 8 ” then, apart from signing, you do not need to complete the remainder of 
the notice form. 
.. . 
Reason for disclosure Box Number 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital of listed company giving rise to a duty to disclose. “ 1" 
“ 2 ” 
Initial disclosure 
'“3” 
Change in percentage level of notifiable interest 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital by a family member (i.e. spouse or children under 18) “4 , ’ 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital by a corporation subject to section 8(2), (3) and (4). “ 5 ” 
(see note 1) ' , 
Disclosure of particulars required by section 7(6) (see note 2) 
“ 丁 、 
Change in particulars required by section 7(6) (see note 2) 
“ 8 ” 
Cease to have notifiable interest 
s S o n 8(2) (3) and (4) deems you to be interested in shares in the relevant share capital of a listed company that are held by 
f c o ^ , o r a S n t h ； directors of which are accustomed to act in accordance with your directions or in which you can exerc.se one-
third or more of the voting rights. 
Thl'particulars required by section 7(6) of the Ordinance are the names of and the number of shares held by the registered 
shareholders. 
D i s S a l l t h e shares that you are interested in. including those that you are deemed to be interested in as a result of section 8 
(i.e. family and corporate interests). If this is an initial disclosure paragraph 5(b) is not applicable. 
6. Y o u S u l c f disclose the name of the person or company with whom you have a joint interest in shares. You should note that 
the Ordinance requires that the person or company with whom you have the joint interest has to make separate disclosures of 
their own if they have a notifiable interest. 
7. S S u l d disclose the interests held by your family members. This is so that the company concerned and the SEHK can 
distinguish between the shares that you hold absolutely and those that you are deemed to hold as a result of your family 
relationship. The family member/s concerned will have to make a separate disclosure if the shares they hold or are deemed to 
hold exceed the notifiable percentage. 
8. D^sdosT^he interest in relevant share capital that you are deemed to hold through other corporations pursuant to section 8 of 
� h e Ordinance If you have any doubts about the consequences of section 8 of the Ordinance legal advice should be taken. It 
these corporations' interests exceed the notifiable percentage they will have to make separate disclosures. There is a separate 
notice form for corporate disclosures. 
9. The^Ordina^nce requires you to disclose the names and addresses of the registered shareholders of the shareholding in the listed 
company disclosed at paragraph 5(a). If you do not have ihese particulars this should not prevent you from filing your 
notification. These particulars can be sent to the SEHK and the company concerned when you obtain them. 
YOU SHOULD CHECK THE NOTICE FORM BEFORE SIGNING IT TO MAKE SURE THAT EVERYTHING THAT YOU HAVE 
STATED IS CORRECT. ‘ 
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APPENDIX-7 
ESTIMATED MEAN AND T-TEST FOR OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
Estimated Mean 
Industry Type Mean SD N 
1 18 46 35 
2 0.1 0.2 9 
3 33.7 88.9 84 
4 21.1 48.8 87 
5 21.4 43.8 85 
6 5.1 11.3 14 
7 183 328.7 7 
Mean: estimated mean of insider activities 
SD: estimated standard deviation 
N: number of observations 
t-test for All Combinations of Differences in Mean 
Industry Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2 . 2.3 
3 1.26 3.47 
4 0.33 4.02 1.14 
5 0.37 � 4 . 4 8 1.14 0.04 
6 1.55 1.64 2.82 2.66 2.9 
7 1.33 1.47 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.43 
t-value > 2 indicates significant difference in mean at 95% confidence level 




Insider activity level of a particular company is measured by the following index: 
100,000 X (insider trading vol per time period/total trading vol for that period) 










ESTIMATED MEAN AND T-TEST FOR OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
Estimated Mean 
Capitalization Mean SD N 
1 32.9 76.9 47 
2 23.7 66.9 86 
3 26.9 61.8 111 
4 13.8 23.5 37 
5 20 48.9 10 
6 6.6 17,3 18 
Mean: estimated mean of insider activities 
SD: estimated standard deviation 
N: number of observations 
t-test for All Combinations of Differences in Mean 
Capitalization 1 2 3 4 5 
2 0.69 
3 . 0.47 0.35 
4 1.61 1.2 1.86 
5 0.68 0.22 0.42 0.39 
6 2.21 . 2.07 2.84 1.29 0.84 
t-value > 2 indicates significant difference in mean at 95% confidence level 
t-value is in absolute value 
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Estimated Mean 
Asset Size Mean SD N 
1 28.1 69.1 46 
2 30.1 73.7 115 
3 14.3 28.5 70 
4 28.3 66.3 46 
5 10.7 30.3 32 
Mean: estimated mean of insider activities 
SD: estimated standard deviation 
N: number of observations 
t-test for Ml Combinations of Differences in Mean 
Asset Size 1 2 3 4 
2 0.17 
3 1.28 2.06 
4 0.01 0.15 1.35 
5 1.5 2.22 0.56 1.57 
t-value > 2 indicates significant difference in mean at 95% confidence level 
t-value is in absolute value 
Note: 
Insider activity level of a particular company is measured by the following index: 




ESTIMATED MEAN AND T-TEST FOR OWNERSHIP C O N C E N T R A T I O N 
Estimated Mean 
Month Mean SD N 
1 24.7 257 319 
2 32.5 272 321 
3 25.6 154 318 
4 18.2 124 319 
5 11.4 48.7 318 
6 36.3 298 318 
7 37 318 320 
8 7.9 36.8 319 
9 57.5 517 318 
10 29.6 194 319 
11 28.2 334 317 
12 33.7 246 318 
Mean: estimated mean of insider activities 
SD: estimated standard deviation 
N: number of observations 
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t-test for All Combinations of Differences in Mean 
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
2 0.37 
3 0.05 0.4 
4 0.41 0.86 0.67 
5 0.9 1.37 1.57 0.9 
6 0.52 0.17 0.56 1 1.46 
7 0.54 0.19 0.58 0.99 1.42 0.03 
8 1.16 1.6 2 1.42 1.04 1.68 1.63 
9 1.01 0.76 1.06 1.32 1.58 0.63 0.6 1.71 
10 0.27 1.16 0.29 0.88 1.61 0.34 0.36 1.95 0.9 
11 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.5 0.88 0.32 0.34 1.07 0.84 0.06 
12 0.45 0.05 0.5 1 1.58 0.12 0.15 1.84 0.74 0.23 0.23 
t-value > 2 indicates significant difference in mean at 95% confidence level 
t-value is in absolute value 
Note: 
Insider activity level of a particular company is measured by the following index: 
100,000 X (insider trading vol per time period/total trading vol for that period) 
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APPENDIX-7 
ESTIMATED MEAN AND T-TEST FOR OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
Estimated Mean 
Ownership Concentration Mean SD N 
1 15.8 40.2 47 
2 11.3 20.3 24 
3 17.5 46.5 41 
4 33.4 71.7 75 
5 64.4 158 48 
Mean: estimated mean of insider activities 
SD: estimated standard deviation 
N: number of observations 
t-test for All Combinations of Differences in Mean 
Ownership Concentration 1 2 3 4 
2 0.63 
3 0.18 0.74 
4 1.74 2.4 1.45 
5 2.06 2.29 1.95 1.27 
t-value > 2 indicates significant difference in mean at 95% confidence level 
t-value is in absolute value 
Note: 
Insider activity level of a particular company is measured by the following index: 
100,000 X (insider trading vol per time period/total trading vol for that period) 
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Ownership Concentration is the % of total shares owned by the top 10 shareholders 
Category 
1 0 < Ownership Concentration <= 5 
2 5 < Ownership Concentration <= 20 
3 20 < Ownership Concentration <= 40 
4 40 < Ownership Concentration <= 60 
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